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1 Introduction1
The persistence of widespread hunger and
malnutrition in India, despite high and enduring
economic growth, continues to fuel academic and
policy debates. These emphasise the magnitude of
the problem; its pace and direction of change over
time; its location; the groups afflicted, and
increasingly, the role of governance. Hunger and
malnutrition reduction in India requires stronger
governance at all levels of administration, in
terms of service delivery, accountability and
responsiveness to citizens’ needs, and greater
availability of high-quality data (Haddad 2009). A
lack of horizontal (between ministries) and
vertical (between Central/State and local
governments) coordination; bureaucratic focus on
inputs and outputs rather than outcomes; low
budget allocations; leakages and weak targeting
hinder improved nutrition outcomes (Mohmand
2011). Further questions remain about the
political commitment of India’s leadership. The
Government of India has stated its desire to act;
most memorably when Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh labelled malnutrition a national
‘curse’ in his 2008 Independence Day speech.
While such public statements demonstrate critical
leadership, they may yet have mere symbolic
value. A better assessment of political
commitment needs to look beyond rhetoric; after
all, action speaks louder than words. 
Accordingly, this article presents the Hunger
Reduction Commitment Index (HRCI), a novel
approach to assess governments’ political
commitment to reduce hunger and malnutrition.
The HRCI demystifies what such commitment
may look like and fosters accountability through
cross-country comparisons and within-country
analyses. 
Existing hunger indices such as the Global
Hunger Index measure outcomes, and are
limited in serving as an accountability
mechanism.2 This is because a multitude of
factors contribute to hunger and malnutrition
reduction, many of which governments cannot
control, such as exclusionary social norms or
insanitary practices within households and
communities, or a sudden economic crisis.
Moreover, limited transparency means that it is
difficult to know what governments are doing to
address the situation. When outcome trends
improve, governments can claim credit (perhaps
falsely) and when they trend badly, governments
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get the blame (perhaps unfairly). The HRCI
hence aims to track a government’s commitment,
in a manner that is credible, sensitive to
government action, achievements and failures
and able to measure progress or regress over
time. Greater transparency will enable civil
society organisations to hold governments to
account and to keep hunger and malnutrition
higher on development agendas. Indian civil
society already has a strong track record pursuing
food justice. Notably, the Right to Food Campaign
has been instrumental in developing the
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment
Guarantee Act (2005), whose initiation of a right
to 100 days of employment per annum enhances
incomes and access to food. Civil society has also
been intimately involved in developing (amongst
others) the National Food Security Bill (2011)
and in reforming flagship programmes such as
the Targeted Public Distribution System and the
Integrated Child Development Services. The
HRCI aims to support such efforts, but also
suggests priorities and aids governments to track
existing efforts and to hold themselves to
account. Finally, by making political commitment
more transparent and linking this to more
effective government action, we3 propose that
over time, greater commitment will lead to better
hunger and malnutrition outcomes. 
2 Conceptualising political commitment to
reduce hunger and malnutrition
In common parlance and academic debates
‘political will’ tends to be equated with ‘political
commitment’, so we use the terms
interchangeably. Political will/commitment is the
‘slipperiest concept in the policy lexicon’
(Hammergren 1998: 12); it is vague, lacks
analytical content, yet is routinely used in a
catch-all (Thomas and Grindle 1990: 1164) or
post-hoc tautological manner (Brinkerhoff 2000).
Our searches failed to identify efforts that
measured or systematically compared political
commitment/will across or within countries.
How then to conceptualise commitment in a way
that facilitates its measurement? Building on
Brinkerhoff (2000), political commitment can be
broken down into components of action and
intention. Commitment has a latent quality: even
in the absence of action, there may be a residual
and intangible element of intention. For example,
decision-makers’ assessments of their capacity to
implement new policies and the strength of
opposition to it will influence their a priori
willingness to make commitments (Morrissey and
Verschoor 2006, in Brinkerhoff 2007). The difficulty
of identifying intention leads us to focus analysis
on government actions. One way of thinking about
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Figure 1 Assessing developing country governments’ political commitment to reduce hunger and malnutrition 
Political
commitment
Data type Theme Indicator
Primary:
for 2 countries
Secondary:
for 21 countries
Policies and
programmes
Expenditures
Legal framework
3 indicators
3 indicators
3 indicators
Policies and
programmes 9 indicators
this is to consider what governments say, what they
do, and what they do not do. Actions of particular
interest concern sustained material, legal and
financial efforts (The Policy Project 2000).
Consequently, we identify three themes under
which government action is compared across a
selected group of developing4 countries: (a) policies
and programmes, (b) legal frameworks, and
(c) public expenditures. This conceptualisation is
potentially applicable to a range of issues well
beyond hunger and malnutrition.
We employ secondary data to calculate index
scores for a set of 21 countries. For two of these,
Bangladesh and Zambia, we also use primary
data. Figure 1 provides an overview of the HRCI
activities, which are discussed in further detail
below. 
3 Building the HRCI using secondary data
Hunger, malnutrition and the commitment to
fighting these are imprecise concepts that can be
approximated by several variables. Hunger and
malnutrition are complex phenomena driven by
amongst others social, biophysical and political
economic factors, and thus offer a wide range of
entry points for government intervention: for
example, on agriculture, social protection, health,
women’s empowerment, poverty reduction, etc.
We select three indicators for each of our
(a) policies and programmes, (b) public
expenditures and (c) legal frameworks themes.
Indicator selection is neither prescriptive nor
exhaustive. It is theory-based, dependent on data
availability, and indicators should:
z cover major aspects of efforts to reduce
hunger: food availability (production and
market availability), food access (e.g. through
(subsidised) purchases or through leveraging
of entitlements) and food utilisation (the
ability to use food to build nutrition status); 
z be simple and transparent;
z be highly correlated within, but not across
themes. 
Moreover, although political commitment should
drive hunger outcomes and vice versa, the
difficulty of attributing outcomes to government
(in)action alone means that we do not use hunger
outcome indicators in calculating commitment
scores. Instead, we present commitment
rankings within the context of country-specific
hunger levels. 
Table 1 sets out the selected indicators for which
we collected secondary data, organised by sector
(data sources are given in: te Lintelo et al. 2011). 
Policies and programmes
For this theme, three indicators are selected: 
z Does a government have a national hunger and/or
nutrition policy or strategy? The existence of
national policies and strategies signals a
government’s recognition of hunger as a
problem that needs addressing, and to steer
government action across administrative levels. 
z Implementation of FAO National Programme for
Food Security. The Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) assists a wide range of
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Table 1 Nine secondary data indicators by dimension of food security and sector, developing countries
Food and agriculture Women’s Social protection Health environment
empowerment
Food availability 1 Public expenditure 5 Women’s access 
on agriculture to agricultural land
Food access 4 Implementation of 2 Public expenditure 7 Constitutional right 6 Civil registration 
FAO National on education to social security of births
Programme for Food 
Security 8 Constitutional 
protection of the right 
to food
Food utilisation 3 Public expenditure
on health
Note Indicator 9 – ‘The existence of a national hunger or nutrition strategy’ covers all cells of table. 
developing countries to start a National
Programme for Food Security. This indicator
looks at the extent to which these are
advancing towards implementation. 
z Civil registration of births (percentage of population).
Public affirmation of an individual’s existence
from birth (to death) is critical for the
effective realisation of legal and civil rights
and socioeconomic state provisions (Szreter
2007: 67–8). It enhances access to a range of
government services, including health and
social protection, that can assist in combating
food insecurity. 
Public expenditures
For this theme, the three indicators are: 
z Public expenditure on health as percentage of total
government expenditure. This indicator
acknowledges the importance of a well-
financed public health system for the
prevention of hunger and malnutrition. 
z Public expenditures on agriculture as percentage of
total government expenditure. Public investment in
agricultural systems is critical, as recognised
in the African Union’s Maputo Declaration
(2003),5 which aspires for member states to
spend at least 10 per cent of government
budgets on agriculture. 
z Public expenditure on education as percentage of gross
domestic product (GDP). This indicator recognises
the central importance of education in achieving
higher incomes to enhance access to food.6
Legal framework
For this theme, the three indicators are: 
z Women’s access to agricultural land. If women in
rural areas had the same access to land,
technology, financial services, education and
markets as men, agricultural production could
be increased and the number of hungry people
reduced by 100–150 million (FAO 2011). 
z Constitutional right to social security. The
constitutional right to social security signals a
clear willingness and strong legal duty for
governments to protect their citizens from
destitution, and attendant hunger. 
z Level of constitutional protection of the right to food.
A constitutional right to food provides a very
clear signal of government commitment to
reduce hunger. This indicator recognises the
various ways in which such a right may be
incorporated in the highest body of law. 
4 Calculating HRCI scores and rankings 
The HRCI builds on ActionAid’s HungerFREE
Scorecard (ActionAid 2009, 2010) to find sufficient
data for 21 out of its selection of 29 countries
with a substantial hunger problem. We normalise
indicator scores to ensure no indicator has
greater weight in the determination of the index
because of its unit of measurement. Each theme
is given equal weight and each indicator is given
equal weight within each theme. The HRCI
employs a Borda ranking scheme (Table 2) to rank
the sum of the rankings rather than the values of
the indicators across themes (Dasgupta 2001). 
Our sensitivity analyses show the HRCI as robust
for our selection of variables, the normalisation
method and weighting scheme. High Spearman
rank correlations and before/after comparisons
demonstrate that country rankings do not vary
substantively after making small changes in
construction of the index. Table 3 shows countries’
overall, and theme-specific commitment rankings. 
Malawi tops the HRCI 2011, reflecting breadth
of strength across themes. Its top ranking is
salient because in the last year, donor support for
Malawi has been partially withdrawn, due to a
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Table 2 Hypothetical Cardinal and Borda ranking schemes compared
Country Policies and Public Legal Cardinal ranking Borda ranking
programmes expenditures framework (based on adding (based on adding 
(a) (b) (c) values of a, b the rankings a, b 
(high score is (high score is (high score is and c) and c)
better) better) better) (1 is best) (1 is best)
India 0.6 0.5 0.9 1 2
China 0.3 0.6 0.5 3 3
Brazil 0.8 0.8 0.1 2 1
worsening political climate. Guatemala ranks
second overall, performing strongly on the legal
framework and policies and programmes themes,
yet it does less well on agriculture, health and
education spending. Brazil, the overall number
three, outperforms Malawi and Guatemala on
two themes, but did not top the list due to a low
ranking on the government expenditure theme.
India is found in thirteenth spot. Had the HRCI
been able to include social protection spending
(which it could not for lack of comparable data),
several countries may have performed better on
the government expenditures theme. These
include, amongst others, Brazil (e.g. Bolsa
Familia), China (dibao) and India (e.g. Mahatma
Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee
Scheme, Public Distribution System). The five
worst performing countries in the HRCI are
Guinea Bissau (21), Zambia (20), China (19),
Nepal (18), and Lesotho and Bangladesh (shared
sixteenth). 
Many countries perform highly divergently on
the three themes. For instance, Tanzania has the
best score on expenditures, but ranks fourteenth
on policy. For Brazil, this situation was reversed.
Inconsistent performance can have strong effects
on overall ranking. For instance, Bangladesh
performs less well than Zambia on the themes of
policies and programmes and on government
expenditures, yet its strong score on legal
framework makes it outperform Zambia overall.
China does fairly well on legal frameworks, but
its weaker scores on policies and programmes
and on spending have substantial effect on its
remarkably low overall ranking. It should be
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Table 3 The HRCI for developing countries: overall and theme rankings (1 is best)
Country Rank: Rank: Rank: HRCI Overall Commitment 
legal government policies and Borda level
framework expenditures programmes score
Malawi 2 4 4 1 56
Guatemala 2 15 2 2 47
Brazil 1 18 1 3 46
Senegal 14 2 7 4 43 ‘High’ 
Ethiopia 2 3 19 5 42
Tanzania 9 1 14 5 42
Ghana 9 7 9 7 41
Gambia 2 12 12 8 40
Uganda 2 17 10 9 37
Rwanda 20 6 3 9 37
Burundi 14 9 6 9 37
Nigeria 2 19 8 9 37 ‘Medium’
India 9 11 11 13 35
Kenya 14 13 5 14 34
Mozambique 14 5 13 14 34
Bangladesh 2 20 20 16 24
Lesotho 19 8 15 16 24
Nepal 13 14 16 18 23 ‘Low’ 
China 9 16 21 19 20
Zambia 21 10 18 20 17
Guinea Bissau 14 21 17 21 14
noted that China’s outstanding hunger outcome
reductions over the last decades are not included
in the HRCI. This result demonstrates the
importance of contextualising commitment:
lower commitment is more compatible with (and
may be driven by) a smaller hunger problem.
The overall Borda scores in Table 3 show that
closeness of ranking may hide dissimilar
performances. For instance, Malawi and
Guatemala differ one rank, yet Malawi scored
nine ‘points’ higher. Similarly, Mozambique and
Bangladesh have just one rank between them,
but this reflects ten Borda ‘points’. Guatemala
and Brazil also differ by one rank, but here this
reflects only one Borda ‘point’. 
How can we relate political commitment scores
to hunger outcomes? In order to draw
comparison, we group commitment levels by
simple reference to the upper, middle and lower
third of countries’ overall HRCI Borda scores
(Table 3). These scores are set out against a
country’s hunger status, as per the Global
Hunger Index (2010 edition).7 This cross-
tabulation (Table 4) suggests that countries like
Malawi, Guatemala, Senegal, Ethiopia and
Tanzania may be fruitful contexts for donors to
advocate and support hunger reduction efforts,
as they are characterised by high commitment
and high levels of hunger. India, despite its
‘alarming’ hunger status, demonstrates only
medium levels of political commitment to do
something about it. The table also shows
countries with low commitment to address a
serious or alarming hunger status: Guinea
Bissau, Zambia, Bangladesh, Nepal and Lesotho.
In a similar vein, commitment levels can be set
off against the ability of state and non-state
actors to act on hunger, as for instance expressed
by wealth, state administrative capacity, and
public accountability (te Lintelo et al. 2011). 
5 Expert perceptions of political commitment
Complementing the HRCI rankings, we employed
a structured survey to capture primary data on
commitment. Thirty Zambian and 45 Bangladeshi
experts on hunger and malnutrition (representing
government, academic, private sector, donors,
and civil society) were asked to indicate their
level of agreement with statements and
questions designed to capture a number of
commitment indicators (Brinkerhoff 2000: 2):
z The institutionalisation of credible incentives for
individuals (in) and between government
agencies (e.g. is poor performance on hunger
objectives sanctioned, and success rewarded?)
z Institutional policy coordination
z Locus of policy origin (e.g. is the implementing
agency the one that designed policy, having
strong ownership?)
z Learning and adaptation mechanisms and
practices (e.g. regular monitoring and
evaluation [M&E]) 
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Table 4 Hunger status and political commitment to reduce hunger
Hunger status (GHI 2010)
Low Moderate Serious Alarming Extremely alarming
Commitment
Low China Nepal Guinea Bissau
Lesotho Zambia
Bangladesh
Medium Kenya India Burundi
Nigeria Rwanda
Gambia Mozambique
Uganda
High Brazil Ghana Malawi Ethiopia 
Guatemala Tanzania
Senegal
z Evidence in decision-making processes (e.g. is
policy informed by new insights on how to
address hunger?)
z Mobilisation of stakeholders (e.g. how well do
government agencies act to obtain widespread
support for interventions?)
z Public commitment (are decision-makers’
policy preferences revealed?)
z Resource allocation and expenditures (e.g. what is
the strength, relevance and sufficiency of
spending on hunger reduction policies?)
z Continuity of effort (e.g. are efforts strong and
sustained, or one-shot efforts?) 
Five-point Likert scales (1 = very strongly, 
2 = strongly, 3 = moderately, 4 = weakly, 5 = very
weakly) were used to calculate indicator and
aggregate scores for the group of experts. As the
same score may mean different things in
different countries, we do not make cross-country
comparisons. The survey instrument, however,
has four advantages: (1) applied regularly, it is
more sensitive to changes in political
commitment than secondary data; (2) it can be
adjusted to a country’s circumstances; (3) it
captures insightful data not expressed in
existing data sources that (4) may inspire expert
networking, initiate dialogue, raise awareness
and foster new action to enhance political
commitment to hunger reduction. While
perception surveys may draw criticism for being
subjective and unable to express ‘true’
commitment levels, this merely underlines the
need for having ‘objective’ data. Good data
should not be the enemy of (non-existent) best
data. 
Table 5 summarises overall findings for Zambia
and Bangladesh. 
The experts assessed that relative to other
dimensions, Bangladesh and Zambia score quite
strongly in terms of institutional coordination,
to challenge international discourses that often
argue the opposite (e.g. Chopra et al. 2009;
Engesveen et al. 2009). Both countries are
judged to do (reasonably) well in terms of locus
of initiative, and analytical rigour underlying
policy efforts, and gained moderate scores for
learning and adaptation, mobilisation of
stakeholders and continuity of effort. Expert
opinions further highlight that weak
institutional incentives for civil servants and
government bodies hinder efforts to combat
hunger. The expert survey thus enables a
diagnosis of commitment aspects on which
governments do better or worse, to suggest to
both governments and advocacy groups what
areas require additional attention to accelerate
hunger and malnutrition reduction. 
6 Conclusions
Food justice demands better governance and
greater government accountability. The HRCI
offers innovative instruments to assess
governments’ political commitment to reduce
hunger and malnutrition reduction. It measures
and ranks countries’ actions towards enhancing
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Table 5 Expert survey scores on commitment indicators: Bangladesh and Zambia (mean scores)
Indicator Bangladesh Zambia
Institutional coordination 2.37 2.19
Government intention and action 2.34 2.01
Locus of initiative 2.42 1.79
Analytical rigour 2.50 1.94
Learning and adaptation 3.05 2.96
Public commitment 3.06 2.49
Mobilisation of stakeholders 3.11 3.00
Continuity of effort 3.32 2.99
Credible incentives 3.90 4.45
Overall score 2.91 2.65
Note 1 = highest commitment; 5 = lowest commitment to hunger reduction
food availability, access and utilisation, as
expressed in policies and programmes; public
expenditures; and legal frameworks.
Malawi, Guatemala, Brazil, Senegal and Ethiopia
head the HRCI 2011 rankings, with Lesotho, Nepal,
China, Zambia (20th) and Guinea Bissau coming
bottom. India occupies a thirteenth position, with
a medium level of political commitment. 
Cross-tabulating political commitment levels
against variables such as hunger status can provide
strategic guidance to governments, civil society,
donors, and other stakeholders as to where their
efforts can make the biggest difference. The
expert survey instrument helps to identify on what
commitment aspects governments perform weakly,
and on which they do well and deserve praise. 
In coming years, the HRCI process will conduct
regular surveys in a growing number of
countries. India is a priority, and new research
will be conducted at national and state levels.
Econometric methods will be used to see if the
HRCI has potential to accelerate hunger
reduction, and community voices engaged to
extend ownership and to gain an additional
‘expert’ perspective on government
commitment. Moreover, we will assess whether,
and if so how, the HRCI process can support
greater advocacy efforts to reduce hunger and
malnutrition. 
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Notes
1 This article is based on research supported by
Irish Aid. 
2 For a review of their qualities and weaknesses,
see Masset (2011).
3 This indicates those people contributing to
developing the HRCI.
4 The HRCI produces two indices: one for
developed (donor), another for developing
countries; this article focuses on the latter. 
5 See www.nepad.org/system/files/Maputo%20
Declaration.pdf.
6 Data on government spending on education as
a share of total government expenditures was
not available (for the same years as on
agriculture and health), and are thus
presented as share of GDP. No comparable
data on social protection spending could be
identified. 
7 See www.ifpri.org/publication/2010-global-
hunger-index.
References 
ActionAid (2010) Who’s Really Fighting Hunger?,
HungerFREE Scorecard 2010, London:
ActionAid
ActionAid (2009) Who’s Really Fighting Hunger?,
HungerFREE Scorecard 2009, London:
ActionAid 
Brinkerhoff, D.W. (2007) ‘Where there’s a Will,
there’s a Way?’, The Whitehead Journal of
Diplomacy and International Relations
Winter/Spring: 111–20
Brinkerhoff, D.W. (2000) ‘Assessing Political Will
for Anti-corruption Efforts: An Analytic
Framework’, Public Administration and
Development 20.3:  239–52
Chopra, M.; Pelletier, D.; Witten, C. and
Dieterich, M. (2009) ‘Assessing Countries’
Readiness: Methodology for In-depth Country
Assessment’, SCN News 37: 17–22
Dasgupta, P. (2001) Human Well-Being and the
Natural Environment, New York: Oxford
University Press 
Engesveen, K.; Nishida, C.; Prudhon, C. and
Shrimpton, R. (2009) ‘Assessing Countries’
Commitment to Accelerate Nutrition Action
Demonstrated in PRSPs, UNDAFs and through
Nutrition Governance’, SCN News 37: 10–16
FAO (2011) The State of Food and Agriculture  –
Women in Agriculture – Closing the Gender Gap for
Development, Rome: Food and Agriculture
Organization
Haddad, L.J. (2009) ‘Lifting the Curse:
Overcoming Persistent Undernutrition in
India’, IDS Bulletin 40.4: 1–8
Hammergren, L. (1998) Political Will, Constituency
Building, and Public Support in Rule of Law
Programs, Washington DC: United States Agency
for International Development (USAID)
Masset, E. (2011) ‘A Review of Hunger Indices
and Methods to Monitor Country
Commitment to Fighting Hunger’, Food Policy
36 Supplement 1: S102–S108
Mohmand, S.K. (2011) Analysing Nutrition
Governance – India Country Report, Brighton:
IDS: 17
Morrissey, O. and Verschoor, A.  (2006) ‘What
does Ownership mean in Practice? Policy
Learning and the Evolution of Pro-Poor
Policies in Uganda’, in A. Paloni and
M. Zanardi, The IMF, World Bank and Policy
Reform, London: Routledge
Szreter, S. (2007) ‘The Right of Registration:
Development, Identity Registration, and
Social Security – A Historical Perspective’,
World Development 35.1: 67–86
te Lintelo, D.J.H.; Haddad, L.J.; Leavy, J.;
Masset, E. and Stanley, A. (2011) Measuring the
Commitment to Reduce Hunger: The Hunger
Reduction Commitment Index, Brighton: IDS
The Policy Project (2000) HIV/AIDS Toolkit –
Building Political Commitment, Washington DC:
The Policy Project  
Thomas, J.W. and Grindle, M.S. (1990) ‘After the
Decision: Implementing Policy Reforms in
Developing Countries’, World Development 18.8:
1163–81
IDS Bulletin Volume 43  Number S1  July 2012 73
